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1. Introduction
There is a high probability that sometime within the next few years, at
least two or three of today’s highly leveraged emerging markets are
going to suffer another traumatic debt crisis. There will be a witch hunt
for culprits, led by various pundits who will, perhaps, point to the injus-
tices of globalization, the lack of democracy in the international finan-
cial institutions, or the technical problems in the “international financial
architecture.” It is hard to guess exactly what the debt crisis “flavor of
the decade” will be, but we will surely see one. And we can be equally
sure that many if not most of these clever pundits will pronounce their
theories in blithe ignorance of the five-hundred-year (plus) history of
international debt problems. If, for example, they attribute the problem
entirely to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, will they
acknowledge that the seemingly endless cycle of booms and busts in
emerging markets has been going on for nearly two hundred years and
that many of today’s rich countries experienced similar cycles in earlier
centuries? Will they remember that the vast majority of historical de-
faults took place well before the terms “globalization” and “financial
architecture” had been coined; well before the sixty-year-old Interna-
tional Monetary Fund or World Bank existed; and in times when there
was no G7? (And had there been one, it would certainly not have in-
cluded the United States or Japan.)
Collective amnesia is not restricted to periods of crisis. The symptoms
are, if anything, worse during the booms between the crises. During
each cycle of new lending, we can find many pundits declaring, “This
time it’s different.” (Indeed, sometimes there are the same pundits who
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later decide they knew it all along.) Take today, for example. “This time
is different” is the current theme song throughout today’s international
capital markets. With interest rates in rich countries at near record lows,
funds in search of higher yields have sharply compressed risk premiums
on emerging market debt. We read that “policies are better” (except in
countries like Venezuala, where they are worse), “exchange rates are
more flexible” (except in regions like Asia, where they are more rigid
than ever), “governments are being more prudent in their borrowing”
(except they seem to borrow more!), “commodity export prices are high”
(except what goes up can come down).
The main theme of this article is that debt cycles are deeply en-
trenched in the process of development, and one must be careful about
trusting magic elixirs that purport to finesse the problem. The nascent
political and economic institutions of middle-income countries often
face extremely high degrees of economic uncertainty, not least stem-
ming from the extraordinary volatility of world commodity and agricul-
tural prices. At the same time many of these countries have exhausted
autarkic growth strategies and find themselves desperately needing to
deepen financial markets in order to allocate scarce saving and expand
growth efficiently. But this process of deepening—often associated with
increased international capital market integration—almost invariably
exposes them to heightened risks. And, unfortunately, once a country
suffers one bout of default, its institutions and markets become weaker
and more vulnerable to further debt problems, a phenomenon Reinhart,
Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) term “debt intolerance.” In turn, debt cri-
ses have dire implications for many critical issues like health care, edu-
cation, the environment, and policy security, not to mention economic
stability.
How can countries emerge? According to our reading of the historical
evidence, the most durable and reliable way a country can graduate
from debt intolerance is to achieve and maintain low levels of both
government debt (external and internal) and overall external debt (owed
by both governments and the private sector). Countries that have es-
caped a history of serial default or countries that have cured their debt
intolerance usually succeed by following this path. Curiously, many sup-
posed “fixes” to the international financial architecture go 180 degrees
in the opposite direction. They aim to change bankruptcy laws—to find
new forms of debt—so that countries can issue more rather than less
debt. We argue that this is a naïve and dangerous read of history.
Section 2 of the article describes the recurring cycle of capital flows,
pointing to why pundits have been convinced time and again that “this
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time it’s different.” Section 3 discusses the concept of debt intolerance.
Section 4 ponders remedies for debt intolerance and serial default. And
Section 5 concludes.
2. Capital Flow Cycles and the Syndrome
of “This Time Is Different”
Cycles in capital flows to emerging markets have now been with us for
nearly two hundred years. The players (both borrowers and lenders)
may change, but the cyclical patterns have remained singularly similar
through time. When interest rates are low and liquidity is ample, global
investors become dissatisfied with the returns they can get by concen-
trating all their assets in global financial centers. Stretching for yield,
they seek higher returns elsewhere.1 During these flush periods it is
easier for governments in emerging markets to borrow from abroad—
and borrow they do. Unfortunately, however, history has shown that for
many of these countries, to borrow is to brook default.
For example, a pattern of borrowing followed by crisis is evident in
the string of defaults during 1826–28 in Latin America that came on the
heels of the first wave of massive capital flows from Britain into Latin
America in 1822–25. These capital flows included not only official bor-
rowing by the newly independent governments for fiscal and nation-
building purposes but also substantial equity capital to finance prospec-
tive silver and gold mines.2 A second wave of capital flows from Britain
came during the 1850s and 1860s. Investors evidentally decided that
“this time it’s different” because loans largely financed railroads aimed
at paving the way toward modernization. The cycle ended with the
crisis of 1873 (Figure 1). The next wave of capital flows into emerging
markets coincided with the shift of the financial epicenter of the world
from London to New York. Among Latin American countries, the bor-
rowing binge of 1925–28 was explained in large part by “development”
loans—the new “this time it’s different” fashion—as governments saw
an opportunity to finance new public works and urban modernization
projects with “cheap” money from New York. Capital flows peaked in
1928, the year before the U.S. stock market crash ushered in financial
and currency crises around the world and eventually an international
debt crisis during 1929–33 (Figure 1).
1 For a discussion of these issues in the present context, see Rogoff (2004); and for
how these cycles are associated with contagious currency crises, see Kaminsky, Reinhart,
and Vegh (2003).
2 See Centeno (2002) and Marichal (1989).
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FIGURE 1
Net Capital Flows
8        Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff
Among the more recent episodes, beginning with the events leading
up to the debt crisis of the 1980s, a surge in capital flow cycle played its
predictable role in precipitating an eventual crash. In the late 1970s
soaring commodity prices fueled by the newly acquired power of OPEC
and high inflation in the advanced economies made “recycling” funds to
emerging markets seem particularly attractive. Policymakers were con-
vinced, however, that “this time it’s definitely going to be different”
because they expected oil and other primary commodity prices to con-
tinue to trend higher, making emerging market commodity exporters
richer and richer. Low, sometimes negative real interest rates and weak
loan demand in the United States further convinced many U.S. banks to
lend to Latin America and other emerging markets—and lend they did.
Capital flows, by way of bank lending, surged (Figure 2). Unfortunately,
albeit inevitably, by the early 1980s the situation had changed signifi-
cantly for the worse, and prospects for repayment of these loans also
became significantly worse. U.S. interest rates had risen markedly in
nominal and real terms and, since most of the loans had either short
maturities or variable interest rates, the effects were passed on to the
borrower relatively quickly. By the time commodity prices had fallen
almost 30 percent between 1980 and 1982, many governments in Latin
America had already engaged in a spending spree that would render
them incapable of repaying their debts. Even prior to Mexico’s default
in August 1982, one after one of these countries had experienced cur-
rency crises, banking crises, or both. When Mexico ultimately defaulted,
the highly exposed and leveraged banks retrenched from emerging
markets in general and from Latin America in particular. The result was
the catastrophic debt crisis of the 1980s, a decade of economic stagna-
tion in Latin America. The 1980s witnessed numerous crises in Latin
America, including some of history’s worst cases of hyperinflation out-
side of episodes of war. The drought in capital flows lasted until 1990.
Figure 2 shows net private capital flows for the contagion episodes of
the 1990s, sharing with the previous figure the common pattern of a
run-up in borrowing followed by a crash at the time of the initial shock
and little or no borrowing thereafter.3 In the case of Mexico, “this time it
was supposed to be different,” because Mexico had implemented a
successful plan of inflation stabilization and linked its fate to the that of
the United States through NAFTA. As the crisis loomed in 1994 (and
3 Note that this phenomenon is not unique to emerging markets. Net private capital
flows in the run-up to the ERM crisis in Europe had risen markedly and peaked in 1992
before coming to a sudden stop.  A key difference was that in the advanced economies
no defaults ensued.
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Mexico’s credit rating was upgraded), capital flows were close to their
1992 peak after surging considerably, since as late as 1989 Mexico had
overwhelmingly recorded net outflows. The rise in capital flows to In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (shown in Fig-
ure 2) was no less dramatic—especially after 1995, with the escalation
of Japanese and European bank lending to emerging Asia. (Remember,
of course, short-term interest rates in Japan were headed toward un-
precedented lows.)
The bottom right panel of Figure 2 shows the evolution of capital
flows to all emerging markets and the progression of crises. The hal-
cyon days of capital flows to emerging markets took place during the
first half of the 1990s, notwithstanding the Mexican crisis and its effects
on Argentina. The eve of the 1996 Asian crisis (which was also “differ-
ent,” as it involved the East Asian miracle economies) marks the peak of
the cycle, and Asia delivers the first blow from which there is no full
recovery. Because total net flows include foreign direct investment (FDI),
FIGURE 2
Net Private Capital Flows, 1985–2003
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which held up better than portfolio bond and equity flows, Figure 2
somewhat understates the extent of the sudden stop problem that emerg-
ing markets faced following the 1998 Russian crisis period. After a sharp
reduction in capital flows to emerging markets during 1998–2002, spreads
have narrowed to levels not seen since the early 1990s and even the
pariahs (like Venezuela) are enjoying cheap access to international
credit—perhaps investors have convinced themselves that President
Chavez has managed to turn Venezuela into Singapore.4
In sum, the borrowing-crisis roller coaster is so established that there
is even a cycle in the warnings about overborrowing. In 1927, for in-
stance, the economic historian Max Winkler wrote:
The over-abundance of funds, together with the difficulty of finding
the most profitable employment therefore at home has contributed
greatly to the pronounced demand for and the ready absorption of
large foreign issues, irrespective of quality… . While high yield on a
foreign bond does not necessarily indicate inferior quality, great
care must be exercised in the selection of foreign bonds, especially
today, when anything foreign seems to find a ready market… .
Promiscuous buying, however, is destined to prove disastrous. (New
York Tribune, March 17, 1927)
In 1929 a wave of currency crises that swept through Latin America was
quickly followed by a string of defaults on sovereign external debt ob-
ligations. Charles Kindelberger and Carlos Diaz Alejandro, scholars who
predicted the 1980s wave of defaults, were among Winkler’s successors.
3. The “Latest” Debt Crisis, Debt Intolerance, and Serial Default
In this section, we discuss the ongoing debt crisis in Argentina, the
concept of debt intolerance and therefore why “this time it’s not differ-
ent,” and the attendant pattern of serial default that has characterized
debt-intolerant countries.
The Latest Debt Crisis
After taming hyperinflation, modernizing its banks, and privatizing its
enterprises, Argentina defaulted in 2001—its fourth sovereign default
since independence. Argentina is not alone. Other countries, like Côte
d’Ivoire or Ecuador, that had restructured their debt less than a decade
ago under the aegis of the Brady Plan have also (yet again) defaulted or
restructured their external debts.
4 For more on this, see Rogoff (2004).
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At present, besides those countries that have already defaulted or
restructured, countries like Brazil, Lebanon, Turkey, and Venezuela
(among several others) are now skirting the danger zone (in terms of
their capacity to repay their debts in the years ahead). It thus appears
that the prospect that debt crises will continue to be with us is almost a
certainty. The “latest” debt crisis has not been quite as synchronized as
the last one in the early 1980s. The dramatic domino effect that the
sharp and sudden rise in real international interest rates to the range of
10 percent (the highest levels since the 1930s) produced is far from
present. As noted earlier, unlike the early 1980s, international interest
rates are remarkably low and alleviate the debt servicing burdens of
debtor nations. High commodity prices are helping developing coun-
tries as well; indeed they have played an important role in Argentina’s
ability to temporarily grow in the shadow of its massive default. Unfor-
tunately, judging from experience, such a favorable setting makes it all
the more tempting for governments of developing countries to borrow
too much and to wait too long to make the more fundamental adjust-
ments need to achieve sustainability.
Debt Intolerance
Why is it that so little debt (by the standards of the industrialized na-
tions, at least) can do so much damage to an emerging market economy,
as well as to its political system and institutions? There are parallels in
medicine. To the lactose intolerant, a small dosage of a dairy product
can produce powerful adverse effects. When it comes to debt, emerging
market countries seem to suffer from a similar malaise. “Debt intoler-
ance” manifests itself in the extreme duress many emerging markets
experience at debt levels that would be considered manageable by ad-
vanced country standards. As investors get jittery, credit lines are often
abruptly cut and trade and economic activity are disrupted.
As shown in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), “safe” levels of
debt (where the risk of financial crisis and default is limited) for debt-
intolerant countries are surprisingly low, perhaps as low as 15–20 percent
of GDP in many cases. Moreover, those thresholds depend critically on
a country’s record of default and inflation. For example, inflation rates
above 40 percent per annum have been commonplace among the most
debt-intolerant serial defaulters. Simply put, governments with a history
of serial default or chronic inflation should shy away from borrowing—
irrespective of how attractive conditions may be at the present juncture.
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Because so many emerging market countries are debt intolerant, it is
worth noting that more than one-half of the default events in emerging
market economies since 1970 took place at external debt-to-GNP ratios
below 60 percent. In other words, crises and default unfolded at debt-
to-GNP levels that would have satisfied Europe’s Maastricht criteria. Thus,
understanding the widespread and fundamental problem of debt intol-
erance is critical in assessing the problems of debt sustainability, debt
restructuring, and the scope for international lending to ameliorate crises.
Serial Defaulters
As noted, serial default on external debt is pervasive and not new. Major
European countries, which set benchmarks that today’s emerging mar-
kets have yet to surpass, seem to have forgotten their own histories now
that their institutions are creditors. For instance, as shown in Table 1,
France used to default every thirty years or so during the period 1500–
1800; Spain defaulted thirteen times between 1500 and 1900. Venezuela’s
nine postindependence defaults (Table 2) look tame by contrast. Gradu-
ation from serial default is neither quick nor easy, in part because safe
levels of debt (that is, those that do not end in a default and a financial
crisis) are remarkably low for serial defaulters. They are much lower
than those for the advanced economies or for the emerging markets that
have never defaulted—and usually involve overthrowing the old politi-
cal regime.
TABLE 1
An Early History of External Debt Defaults: Number of Defaults
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TABLE 2
External Debt Defaults in Emerging Markets, 1824-2001
4. Remedies for the Debt Intolerant and the Institutions That
Deal with Them
So what policies should countries adopt and multilateral institutions
endorse to avoid the problem of debt intolerance and serial default?
First and foremost—there are no quick fixes. Graduation from the debt-
intolerance club does not come quickly.
The Governments
The policy challenge for these countries is to address a chronic long-
term problem—debt intolerance. Solutions do not lie in taking remedial
measures that allow them to gain the favor of international capital mar-
kets for a few of months, or even years. At a very minimum, this means
curbing the all-too-common tendency of governments to borrow in good
times, when markets are all too willing to lend. The evidence that fiscal
policies are procyclical is fairly compelling.5 The fiscal restraint has to
be consistent—a few years of good behavior simply will not do.
Argentina’s 2001 default is testimony to the need for fiscal restraint over
the course of perhaps decades rather than years and for budget rules to
discipline politicians. Lest we forget, Argentina’s government showed
5 For fresh evidence for 105 countries and a survey of the literature, see Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and Végh (2004).
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significant fiscal restraint in the early 1990s, at the time when it was fast
becoming the poster child of the international community.
The fact that borrowing in most developing countries usually ends in
a financial or debt crisis (or both) may owe to a vicious cycle (with
origins that include but are beyond tarnished reputations) in which de-
fault weakens institutions and makes future defaults more likely. Hence,
the need for policymakers in these countries to internalize the under-
standing that “safe” debt thresholds are country specific and depend
importantly on history. Because of a weak institutional framework, “safe”
external debt thresholds for highly debt-intolerant emerging markets
appear to be surprisingly low, perhaps as low as 15–20 percent of GNP
in many cases. And these thresholds depend heavily on the country’s
record of default and inflation. It is not unusual to find, for example,
that most of the larger emerging markets that are most debt intolerant
(such as Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey) have the worst inflation track
records—with about a 50 percent chance that annual inflation will be
above 40 percent! Debt-intolerant countries also tend to have weak fis-
cal structures and weak financial systems. Default often exacerbates
these problems, making these same countries more prone to future de-
fault. Indeed, more insights are needed to shed light on what other
factors (economic, political, and institutional) figure in the calculus of
what debt levels are sustainable—both external and domestic—and what
are the true long-term costs of defaulting.
The Myth: Countries Can “Simply Grow Out of Their Debt”
During “good times,” when it is easy for governments to borrow liberally,
the chronically deluded (or the opportunistic) will inevitably argue that
borrowing is not a problem, as “this time” the country will grow out of
its debts. Lamentably, however, there is little evidence to support such
optimism. How, historically, have emerging market countries with
substantial external debts managed to work them down? This is a
phenomenon that has previously received surprisingly little attention.
As Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) show, in episodes where
external debt-to-GNP fell substantially over a three-year period, almost
two-thirds involved some form of default or restructuring. Only in one
case—Swaziland in 1985—was a country able to “grow” its way out of
its debt.
The Multilaterals
As to the multilateral organizations, it is time to turn many of the popu-
lar criticisms on their head. The International Monetary Fund has been
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vilified for the “austerity” of its programs (usually in crisis episodes).
Such criticisms are often misplaced; as in times of crisis, for example,
when capital flight is rife, there are few (if any) alternatives to austerity.
Surprisingly, the IMF has not received sufficient well-deserved criticism
for its complacency as countries pile up the debt “in the good years.”
(Michael Mussa’s account of the run-up to the Argentine crises of 2001 is
a notable exception.) If history offers us a clear and crisp lesson, it is
that the seeds of debt crises are sown when the outlook is benign. It is
in these good years that the IMF has shown a persistent inclination not
to ruffle the feathers of member governments while heaping (often un-
deserved) praise on their economic program. The World Bank can often
be even worse, as when just prior to the Asia crisis it released a report
giving a clean bill of health to Indonesia’s soon to be troubled banking
system.
An example of the official communities’ willingness to look the other
way is manifest in its optimistic public statements about risks facing the
European accession countries, some of which are sustaining significant
fiscal and current account deficits combined with a nontrivial loss of
international competitiveness. The official community continues to
downplay risks in Brazil and Turkey, despite the fact that Brazil is expe-
riencing only modest growth in the face of nearly ideal external condi-
tions, while Turkey’s debt still exceeds 85 percent of GDP.
It is fair to say, however, that it is usually during the good times that
it matters little to governments whether the IMF chides them or not for
taking advantage of the opportunity to borrow copiously. It is precisely
then that the multilaterals have the least leverage over policies. After all,
myopic governments will always find the perfect excuse in such circum-
stances: “this time it’s different.” As the history of serial defaults shows,
however, it is usually the case that times are not different enough and
the borrowing binge usually ends in tears.
Financial Architecture: The Big Picture
Virtually every international economist would agree that one of the major
unanswered questions in the field is why capital does not flow from rich
countries to poor ones. That, of course, is the title of a famous paper by
Robert Lucas (1990), which is why it is often called the Lucas paradox.6
6 A different  and earlier explanation for the “paradox” of why capital does not flow
from rich to poor countries that stresses capital market imperfections rather than human
capital externalities as in Lucas can be found in Gertler and Rogoff (1989; 1990).  For a
discussion of this so-called paradox, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
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In attempting to fashion a practical resolution to the Lucas paradox,
some researchers rely on the following chain of logic:
— Since capital flows are insufficient to pull up the capital stock of
emerging market economies to industrial standards,
 — it must be the case that emerging market economies borrow too
little.
 — Therefore, mechanisms must be found to let them take on more
debt.
 — Among those mechanisms encouraging debt issuance are collec-
tive action clauses (CACs).
 — Therefore, CACs are useful.
The problem is that the second premise is a non sequitur. As shown by
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004),
emerging market economies do not borrow too little; rather, they bor-
row too much. A significant fraction of countries are debt intolerant
because their weak political systems, unequal distributions of income,
inconsistent rules of law, and narrow and volatile tax bases imply that
they cannot reliably service debt. For a country with such problems, to
borrow is ultimately to default. If a significant fraction of emerging mar-
ket economies are debt intolerant, efforts to make it easier to borrow
will end in tears because making it easier to borrow will make it easier
to default. Moreover, such an emphasis on borrowing will distract from
more important and lasting mechanisms that foster direct investment in
countries where rates of return should be very high. Making progress
on that front is a more difficult way of improving the legal and political
infrastructure of the country and making balance sheets more transpar-
ent. That job is not being done quickly and will only prove itself useful
over time.
5. Concluding Observations
But the fact that officials and staff of finance ministries and international
financial institutions have been so focused on the sovereign debt
restructuring mechanisms (SDRM) and collection actions clauses (CACs)
may be an implicit criticism of the net contribution of the work on the
international financial architecture. When asked about CACs, SDRM, and
other financial architecture fixes, we suggest a simple answer: Any
“solution” that relies on international securities lawyers to promote a
welfare-improving change is necessarily overstated. At this writing, it is
impossible to generalize from the very limited experience with sovereigns
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issuing collective action clauses. Worrying about effects measured in
basis points with sizable standard errors misses the larger point: Emerging
market economies borrowed too much not too little, and helping them
to borrow more may not be helping them.
This suggests that academics and officials may want to be humble in
their ambitions for “fixing” the existing financial architecture. Some prob-
lems may be too big and too basic for the international community to
solve. Why should we think that a problem that has existed for five
centuries across several continents can be solved by the stroke of a pen?
The only durable and reliable solution for countries that aim to emerge
from debt intolerance is to achieve low debt levels (by growth and
repayments if possible, by restructuring if necessary) and to maintain
those low levels. The international community can be helpful by mak-
ing it harder not easier for developing countries to use rich country
courts to enforce loans.7 And the official community needs to exercise
more restraint in bailouts, so as not to exacerbate moral hazard and
encourage and deepen the next cycle of imprudent borrowing.
   7 See Bulow and Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff (1999).
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